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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of democracy and democratization
on contemporary Muslim societies. The institutional and philosophical
approaches to democracy and democratization are inseparable. The paper
investigates the relationship between the philosophical dimension of Western
democracy and the Muslim philosophy of life and concludes that the
democratization of contemporary Muslim societies leads to serious and
destabilizing ideological polarization and division of Muslim societies into
supporters of secularism and political Islam. The Islamist-secularists relation
radicalizes: (1) when the Islamists are prevented from capturing power through
democratic institutions and (2) when the advanced Western democratic states
cooperate with non-democratic secular elites of Muslim societies. The
destabilizing role of democracy can be moderated if the Islamists are engaged
in the democratic process, and the debate between the Islamists, the secularists
and the West  based on the view that the West should conceive Islam as an
alternative weltanschauung (worldview)  focuses on issues that are human
properties, irrespective of religion, ethnicity or language. The institutional
approach to democracy provides a common ground for cooperation and
dialogue between the Islamists, the secularists and the West.
Keywords: Democratization, institutional and philosophical approaches,
Muslim societies, political Islam, the West
Abstrak: Makalah ini meneliti impak demokrasi dan pendemokrasian ke atas
masyarakat Islam kontemporari. Pendekatan institusi dan falsafah terhadap
demokrasi dan pendemokrasian tidak dapat dipisahkan. Makalah ini meneliti
hubungan antara dimensi falsafah demokrasi Barat dan falsafah hidup Islam
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dan menyimpulkan bahawa pendemokrasian ke atas masyarakat Islam
kontemporari mengarah kepada polarisasi ideologi yang serius dan
destabilisasi serta perpecahan masyarakat Islam kepada penyokong
sekularisme dan politik Islam. Hubungan Islamis-sekular menjadi radikal: (1)
apabila Islamis dihalang daripada pendapat kuasa melalui institusi
demokratik dan (2) apabila negara-negara demokratik Barat yang maju
bekerjasama dengan para elit sekular yang tidak demokratik daripada
masyarakat Islam. Peranan demokrasi yang tidak stabil boleh dibendung
jika Islamis terlibat dalam proses demokratik, dan perdebatan antara Islamis,
kaum sekular dan Barat  berdasarkan pandangan bahawa Barat harus
melihat Islam sebagai sebuah alternatif weltanschauung  (pandangan hidup)
 menumpukan kepada isu-isu yang bersifat keperimanusiaan, tanpa mengira
agama, etnik atau bahasa. Pendekatan institusi kepada demokrasi
menyediakan satu landasan bersama untuk kerjasama dan dialog antara
Islamis, kaum sekular dan Barat.
Kata kunci: Pendemokrasian, pendekatan institusi dan falsafah, masyarakat
Islam, politik Islam, Barat
Based on the assumptions of democratic peace theory, it is often
argued that Muslim societies would be better off if they democratize.
This study, however, argues that democratization of contemporary
Muslim societies, and the Wests selective cooperation with only
some elected governments of the Muslim world, have resulted in
ideological polarization and radicalization of politics within Muslim
societies. The relationship between democracy and the ideological
divide, and violence in contemporary Muslim societies, requires
investigation of the relationship between the philosophical dimension
of Western democracy and the philosophy of life prevalent in the
Muslim world. This study, firstly, discusses the meaning and aims
of Western democracy. Secondly, it discusses the basic
presuppositions of secularism and the Muslim worldview. Thirdly,
the study examines the relationship between secularism, democracy
and Islam. Fourthly, the study discusses the approaches to democracy
and the implications of Western democracy on Muslim societies.
Finally, it discusses a possible way out that could moderate the
destabilizing effects of democracy.
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Democracy: Meaning and aims
A conceptual analysis of the term democracy is essential to know
its positive or negative impact on human relations. For the purpose
of this study, understanding of the meaning and aims of the word
democracy can set the stage for the ensuing discussion about the
relationship between Western democracy, Islam/Muslim philosophy
of life, secularism and approaches (philosophical and institutional)
to democracy. The word democracy is understood differently.
Democracy assumes that exercising of decision-making power by
one or few over issues of public concern is not desirable. It should
be transferred to the people. The concept popular sovereignty
binds the various meanings of democracy together. It emphasizes
that ordinary human beings are able to rule themselves and can
collectively make rational decisions about complex social matters.
Academics have explored means and ways that can best ensure that
people, directly or indirectly, make decisions and determine their
own lives. They have used terms like direct, participatory,
representative, competitive, liberal, etc. to suggest the various ways
people could participate in governing and managing their affairs
(Held, 1996). The usage of such terms suggests that the
operationalization of popular sovereignty does not negate the idea
of people being ruled. Indeed, democracy is about governing and
being governed. But the ones who appear to be ruled are indeed the
rulers, as all ruling elites (i.e., democratic governments) are expected
to exhibit the following attributes: constitutionalism, accountability
and transparency, respecting human rights, a doctrine of
individualism, majority rule and minority rights, political competition,
universal suffrage, popular sovereignty, rule of law, alteration of
power, etc. For the implementation of these principles of popular
sovereignty, states have adopted different institutions and procedures
such as constitutions, elections and electoral colleges, universal
franchise, consultative assemblies or legislatures, civil societies,
political parties and parliamentary or presidential systems of
government.
The exercise of popular sovereignty (i.e., democracy) is not an
end in itself. Democratic government is rather a means to an end.
Aristotle in his work, The Nichomachean Ethics, observes that the
end of politics is happiness or a good life (McLean, 1997, p.12). Al-
-238     INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE, VOL 18, NO 2, 2010
FÉrÉbÊ  in his work, the  ÓrÉ al-MadÊnah al-FÉÌilah concludes that
the end of the state is happiness (al-Farabi, 1985, pp.27-31). It is
interesting to observe that al-Farabi and Aristotle, although differing
in their understanding of happiness, did not see politics as an end in
itself. Abdolkarim Soroush (2000), in categorizing values into (1)
guiding values and (2) serving values, argues that guiding values
are essential for existence of human life. These are the values for
the sake of which we live (p.39). Promotion and protection of
guiding values is therefore essential and necessary as they are eternal
and transcend social life, nationality and history (p.39). Values
essential for life are goodness, justice, generosity and courage
(p.39). The serving values assist man in attaining the guiding values
and hence exist for the sake of living (p.39). The primary serving
values are the ones that predate the event (i.e., development or
democratization of life), while the secondary serving values are the
changed form of primary values generated after the event. When
primary serving values are supplanted by secondary serving values,
they result in the emergence of a new institution or government that
can serve life better. Put differently, the new system or institution
will gradually supplant the old system (p.39). Soroushs view
suggests that the serving values (i.e., institutions) can vary in time
and space. What does not change is the substance and nature of the
values they serve (i.e., guiding values). The above discussion
suggests that the aim of exercising popular sovereignty is to achieve
one or more of the following fundamental values or goods: political
equality, liberty, moral self-development, the common interest, a
fair moral compromise, binding decisions that take everyones
interest into account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants and
efficient decisions (Held, 1996, p.3).
Given democracys (i.e., popular sovereignty) instrumental role
read together with Soroushs analysis, a number of crucial questions
need to be answered. What are the values that have guided
democracy and the democratization process throughout history? Are
the guiding values of Western democracy compatible with the Muslim
philosophy of life? Would Muslim societies be better off by whole-
heartedly introducing Western democracy and democratizing based
on the values so characteristic of Western societies? Therefore, a
debate on democracy and democratization of the Muslim world
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essentially entails answers to the above questions. It is argued that
the democratic debate takes shape within a secular frame of mind.
Then, is secularism compatible with Muslim philosophy of life? This
leads to the assumption that understanding the nature of the
relationship or degree of compatibility or incompatibility between
Islam and democracy is based on understanding the nature of the
relationship between democracy and secularism.
Secularism versus Muslim worldview
This section discusses the Islamic and secular weltanschauung. The
aim is to provide a context for the discussion of the relationship
between democracy, Islam and secularism. According to Ahmet
Davutoglu (1994), in the Islamic weltanschauung, the axiological
(ethics), ontological (existence) and epistemological (source of
knowledge) presuppositions about life and politics differ from those
of the West and the latter should perceive the former as such (pp.12-
86). The origin of Western democracy is secular and opposed to the
religious basis of Muslim philosophy of life and existence.
Application or introduction of an essentially secular concept to
Muslim societies with a monotheistic bent of mind requires one to
know what secularism is and how the Muslim philosophy of life is
different from the secular approach to life and existence. Secularism
is a belief anchored in the conviction that God is dead, and in
rationalization of life and society. While it does not deny man having
faith in God, it removes the determining role of God in human affairs.
Rational philosophy provides the autonomy to man to freely
investigate and determine the truth or reality without help from an
external or divine being. Secularism originates in the belief in
humanitys ability and potential to know, discover and understand
the human, metaphysical and physical spheres of life without divine
help.
According to Amr Sabet (2008), secularism projects mankind
as the primary cause of not only a few instruments of production,
but also of social, political, cultural and religious modes of existence
contrived by its subjective and objective exertions. In this capacity,
individuals become the masters of nature and therefore external to
and independent of it (p.29). Secularism relies on pure reason as
standards of morality without any metaphysical sanction (Asad,
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1961, p.7). Therefore, it rejects the role of the Divine other than
creating the universe and everything therein. It is often mistakenly
argued that its genesis is found in modern scientific knowledge
(Soroush, 2000, pp.57-68). Therefore, scientification or
rationalization of social and political thought and deliberation in
the Western frame of mind has existed since the existence of
humanity for the simple reason that the existence of god or religion
is not supported by archaeological findings. It will not be incorrect,
therefore, to argue that modern Western scientific knowledge was
not a result of the revival of secular tendency in the Greco-Roman
intellectual and political legacy but the revival of secular tendency
prevalent in the human mind at the point of mans very existence on
earth (McNeill, 1991, pp.3-240).
The political manifestation of rational philosophy is seen in the
fact that it is defined not only by what it is not, that is, a nonreligious
government, but by what it is, a government susceptible to criticism,
checks, and balances (Soroush, 2000, p.60). Hence, a secular
government is defined as a regime in whose polity no values and
rules are beyond human appraisal and verification and in which no
protocol, status, position, or ordinance is above public scrutiny.
Everything is open to critique, from the head of state to the manner
of government and the direction of policy determination (p.60).
The appraisal, however, is purely human without divine help.1
Unlike secularism, the Muslim world view is centred on the belief
in the principle of TawhÊd (all-encompassing Unity of Allah the most
High), the One and only Divine Being. It is a conviction and
witnessing that there is no god but God (al-FÉrËqÊ, 1992, p.9). It
is the conviction that He is the Creator and everything else is His
creation. In IsmÉÊl al-FÉrËqÊs words, the above ...negative
statement, brief to the utmost limits of brevity, carries the greatest
and richest meaning of the whole of Islam. Sometimes a whole
culture, a whole civilization, or a whole history lies compressed in
this one sentence All the diversity, wealth and history, culture and
learning and wisdom of Islam is compressed in this shortest of
sentences (pp.9-10). The implication of TawÍÊd for life and
thought is as follows. The created world is composed of human life
and the natural world which has two components: the physical and
non-physical. The components of the created world are meaningfully
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related to one another. They are also collectively related to the Creator
in a meaningful way. He defines the relationship among the elements
of the created world and between the created world and its Creator.
He knows the true nature of every single element including the
internal and external make-up of man. Man has the ability of making
and doing, yet his capabilities are limited, bounded and incomplete.
Man needs to complete this incomplete or bounded capability with
another element  revelation. Revelation is part of the Divine bounty
gifted to man to complete his incomplete and bounded ability. God
personally does not come and preach. Revelation comes to man
through a medium called prophecy. God has given man the ability
to understand and interpret the revealed message. Hence the rational
faculty of man and revelation are intrinsically and permanently in
harmony (pp.9-10). It is only natural that revelation takes precedence
over reason in that the former is divine as it has come to perfect
mans understanding of social reality. Contradictions that may arise
would need the redefinition of rational conclusions arrived at by
reason.
It is interesting to observe that the Muslim worldview does not
reject reason in search for truth. It is absurd to reject reason and at
the same time employ it for understanding truth, justice, tolerance
and public interest as ordained by God and provided by religious
teachings. It would be difficult for religion itself, or, for that matter,
God, to become a useful source if what God intends for humanity is
not understood. It is important to note that while reason can help us
to understand religion, it also historicizes religious teachings,
reflecting the influence of specific historical conditions under which
reason operates. Rational interpretation of religious teachings is
human and cannot be universalized in time and space. Muslim
scholars and the public are required to constantly engage in rational
interpretation of religious texts, as the appeal to religious conviction
cannot and should not arrest the renewal of religious understanding
or innovative adjudication (ijtihÉd) in religion (Soroush, 2000,
p.128). Reason belongs to the enlightened. Hence the public has
the responsibility to elect the enlightened ones to the helm of power.
In the final analysis, the dichotomy of life and politics  that things
are either religious or non-religious  fails to have a place in the
Muslim mind.
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Democracy, secularism and Islam
The preceding discussion focused on the meaning of secularism
and Muslim philosophy of life. This section focuses on the link
between democracy, secularism and Islam. The aim is to show when
Western democracy becomes incompatible with the Muslim
philosophy of life, as well as when and which parts of democracy
and democratization are compatible with the Muslim view of life, to
which supporters of political Islam can and should hold on without
hesitation. The aim of a democratic government is to achieve
Soroushs guiding values or, in Helds words, one or more of the
following fundamental values or goods: political equality, liberty,
moral self-development, the common interest, a fair moral
compromise, binding decisions that take everyones interest into
account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants and efficient
decisions (Held, 1996, p.3). Attainment of these values requires
construction of suitable institutions and procedures. Democracys
emphasis on popular sovereignty suggests that knowledge of the
contents and substance of the fundamental values that a democratic
government seeks to attain, and the forms and nature of institutions
for the realization of these is within human reach. In its wider
connotation, this term implies the peoples unrestricted right to
legislate by majority vote on all matters of public concern (Asad,
1961, p.19). The will of the people is free of all external limitations,
sovereign unto itself and responsible only to itself (p.19). For
instance, the collective will of the people can determine what
constitutionalism or common good is. It can also determine whether
the laws and procedures a modern parliament legislates reflect the
true spirit of the fundamental values sought by the democratic
government. By adopting this humanocentric or anthropocentric
approach to the definition of values and construction of institutions,
democracy has succeeded in banishing religion from the realm of
politics and placing the right of legislation and government
exclusively in peoples hands (Soroush, 2000, p.57). In this way,
democracy and secularism are drawn closer as both emphasize
rationalization of life and society. While secularism detached religion
from life, democracy rejected the Divines right to rule with what is
known as popular sovereignty.
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Unlike the secular approach, the Muslim approach to democracy
holds that the contents and substance of the values that democratic
governments seek to attain, and the democratic institutional setup
in Muslim societies are divinely inspired. The fundamental
democratic values are determined by God whereby the institutional
framework is a human construct. Human reason plays an active
role in understanding the true nature of Divine intentions but it
quickly refutes the view that true knowledge of the values are within
human reach. The role of the human mind is restricted to an
adjudicative understanding of religion including matters that religion
does not speak of or is silent about. The functions and attributes of
democratic institutions and procedures such as legislature or elections
of the executive are determined by humans in such a way that they
ultimately lead to the attainment of values ordained by God. While
the fundamental values a democratic government seeks to attain are
religious and divine, and hence eternal, the interpretations of the
fundamental values and the functions of the democratic institutional
setup are historicized and can be placed under scrutiny, criticism
and improvement inspired by God.
It is thus evident that the people have determined to live in the
shade of a religious belief. This preliminary decision by the people
paves the way to eternal existence under the teachings of religion.
However, it also paves the way to innumerable subsequent decisions
and arduous trials. From there on, it is religious understanding that
needs to undergo constant examination. It will have to pass through
difficult cycles of contraction, expansion, modification and
equilibrium. In this way, the Muslim approach banishes
humanocentrism and imposes fundamental benchmarks on the
operation and functions of the principle of popular sovereignty. In
this ethnocentric approach adopted by Muslim societies, religion
and God become the guide and arbiter for decisions on complex
social matters. A precondition for the full-scale realization of the
Muslim approach to a democracy of this kind is that the democratic
government is meaningful only when the society is religious. A
religious society is the supporter and source of religious politics.
Without a religious society, a religious democratic government will
be inconceivable (Soroush, 2000, p.132). Obviously, this poses
serious challenge to Muslim societies inflicted with the malaise of
secularism.
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Approaches to democracy: Implications for contemporary
Muslim societies
The preceding discussion suggests that democracy is secular and
incompatible with the Muslim way of life. Yet, supporters of political
Islam believe in the efficiency of democracy and hold to
democratically elected governments for the realization of Gods will.
The supporters of political Islam do not want to be deprived of
participating in the democratic processes in Muslim societies. It is
necessary to raise again the question posed by John Esposito whether
Islam and democracy are compatible. According to him, they are
compatible (Esposito, 2004, pp.93-100). However, given the fact
that the presuppositions of the Islamic weltanschauung are different
from those of the secular weltanschauung, a simple yes answer is
not helpful to explain the issue of compatibility of Islam and
democracy. Esposito is aware of this fact and rightfully observes
that democratization in the Muslim world [does] not imply uncritical
acceptance of Western democratic forms (p.97).
The relation between Islam and democracy is complex and
requires analysis. According to the Islamic weltanschauung, some
aspects of democracy are compatible with Muslim life and some are
not. Knowledge of what is and what is not acceptable to them in
Western democracy entails a discussion of approaches to democracy
in Muslim societies. Based on the presuppositions of the Islamic
weltanschauung, two interrelated approaches to democracy and the
democratization process with implications for Muslim societies can
be identified: (1) the institutional approach and (2) the philosophical
approach. It is essential to note that the two approaches are
interrelated in that the institutional basis of democracy cannot be
separated from the philosophical basis of democracy in the Muslim
mind. Put differently, the doctrine or philosophy, as Abou El Fadl
(2004) argues, is as much a part of the practical affairs of human
existence (for Muslim societies) as any other factor that causes
[Muslims] to think, feel and undertake particular courses of actions
(p.110) such  as governing and ruling which is central to the
institutional approach. The role of doctrine or religious convictions
in the lives of believing Muslims cannot be ignored because God is
an ever present reality and essential frame of reference for all
normative judgments (p.110).
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Institutional approach means evolution and introduction of
institutions, procedures and laws such as a constitution, civil society,
elections, consultative assemblies, election laws, rule of law (Islamic
law not SharÊah)2 and the party and party system that will eventually
lead to institutionalization of the fundamental democratic values such
as freedom of expressions, freedom and autonomy of the press,
constitutionalism, accountability, realization of purposes of the
SharÊah, universal compulsory education and political equality. A
situation is then created that restricts the power of the rulers and
rationalizes:
[T]heir deliberations and policies, so that they will be less
vulnerable to error and corruption, more open to exhortation,
moderation, and consultation; and so that violence and
revolution will not become necessary. Constant review,
critiques and renewal of ideas and beliefs, followed by
emendation, calibration, and transformation of the policies
and decisions of rulers and their powers are among the routine
responsibilities of democratic societies (Soroush, 2000,
pp.134-135).
The institutional approach therefore includes both Sorouchs primary
and secondary serving values. The democratic values such as
freedoms and accountability are the primary serving values, whereas
the institutions such as constitutions and civil society are the
secondary serving values. The purpose of democratic institutions is
the empowerment of the people and placing restrictions and limitation
on the exercise of power by the governing elite, with the ultimate
aim of creating a democratic space in which the elite feels accountable
and strictly adheres to the rule of law and observes human rights.
The people also enjoy freedoms and are able to participate in the
political process and as a result some degree of accountability and
constitutionalism prevails. Hence, as Khaled Abou El Fadl (2004)
argues, the core element of democratic practice is exhibited (pp.3-
4).
When an actual democratic space is created, there is the feeling
that the popular sovereignty is at work, as is the case with developed
and advanced Western liberal democracies. It follows that the
institutional approach is based on the view that citizens are the source
of political power and authority. It ought to be exercised and
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transferred to the ruling elites through an elaborate institutional setup
such as elections, constitutions, civil society and so forth. The
democratic conception of peoples authority or citizens as the locus
or source of political authority does not contradict with the view
that God is the ultimate source of everything, for God has given the
right of choosing the ruling elite to citizens and they are ordered to
exercise this right with great responsibility and divine consciousness.
God has made the choosing of representatives the citizens duty,
which ought to be carried out in line with His teachings and
guidance. Democratic institutions become the instrument towards
fulfilling a fundamental responsibility assigned by God to the
citizens of an Islamic polity (pp.3-4). It also follows that there exists
a common democratic denominator (i.e., democratic institutional
setup) for operationalzing sovereignty which Islam and the West
can agree on and which can draw the Muslim societies and the West
closer. According to Muslim intellectuals, the institutional basis of
democracy and people as the locus of political authority has been a
historical fact rooted in the practices of the immediate successors of
the Prophet of Islam. Muslims jurists of AbË ×anÊfahs calibre
remained critical of non-elected leadership. AbË ×anÊfah told the
second Abbasid Caliph, ManÎËr, that you have become a caliph
even without a couple of men from ahl al-fatwÉ (those whose opinion
is respected and authoritative) agreeing to it, whereas the caliph
should be chosen with the conference and concurrence of Muslims
(Maudoodi, 1963). Modern Muslim thinker,  Rashid Rida upheld
this authoritative determination of citizens in choosing the ruler.
According to him, no obedience is due to a leader installed by force,
and it is the duty of citizens to overthrow such a ruler (Kerr, 1996,
pp.168-169).
The discussion above suggests that sovereignty in the Muslim
weltanschauung is of two types: political and legal, or what Muqtedar
Khan (2000) calls sovereignty in fact (de facto) and sovereignty
in principle (de jure) (p.65), respectively. When reference is to the
locus of political power and authority, political sovereignty is at
work. All the agencies and institutions that assist in the transfer of
power from the citizens to the elite become its integral properties. In
this way, political sovereignty is drawn closer to and is closely
associated with the institutional approach. Legal sovereignty is,
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therefore, distinguished from political sovereignty when God is
considered the ultimate source of moral standards and laws, and
provides a framework for the exercise of political sovereignty. Legal
sovereignty is closely associated to the philosophical approach to
democracy and democratization.
The Muslim view does not conflict with institutional approach
to democracy and democratization. Perhaps this explains the reasons
for contemporary Muslim intellectuals and academics in advocating
the democratization of contemporary Muslim societies. Scholars,
academics and activists such as Abu Ala al-Maudoodi, Yusuf al
Qaradawi, Abdul Kareem Soroush, Rachid Ghannouchi, Azzam
Tamimi, Abdul Rahman A. Kurdi, Khaled Abou El Fadl and Abdul
Rashid Moten have strenuously argued that democratization can rid
Muslim societies from poverty, illiteracy, corruption, abuse of power
and violation of human rights. Democracy is able to return to the
people the honour, dignity and control over their destiny that they
have lost. These scholars have resorted to Qur Énic verses, prophetic
traditions and practices of the early generations of Islam to suggest
that Islam has always abhorred corruption, abuse of power and
courted the call for justice, rule of law, equality and a constitutional
frame of political activism (Qaradawi, 1998; Tamimi, 1993). While
advocating democratization of Muslim societies, they also advocated
that democratic governments in contemporary societies are required
to function within the frame of divine justice (Maudoodi, 1980),
distinguishing the Muslim approach from the Western approach and
philosophy to democracy and democratization. Noah Feldman
argues that [n]one of these Islamic democrats is prepared for an
Islamic state that flouts the authority of QurÉnic verses that seem to
have a relatively clear meaning in Muslim community (Feldman,
2004, p.60). Reflecting on the constitution of Madinah, it would not
be misplaced to argue that even Prophet Muhammads political
authority over the citizens of the maiden Islamic state was rooted in
the consent of the Muslim immigrants from Makkah and the
indigenous Muslims and the Jews of Madinah (Al-Umari, 1995).
Abou El Fadl (2004) argues that a provisional case for
democracy (p.7) is made when the citizens have come to recognize
a legitimate method of exercise of power and government legitimate.
But, he says, we have not considered the great challenge to that
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case (p.7), that is, God, and not man, as the source of law determines
the legitimacy and rightfulness of the policies and actions of the
government. Determining of the legitimacy of political institutions
does not fall within the scope of the institutional approach. Here,
Western democracy poses a formidable challenge to an Islamic
polity. This challenge is doctrinal and philosophical and not
institutional in character. The doctrinal character of democracy and
Islam are defined in the first instance in terms of definer and originator
of their underlying moral values and the attitudinal commitments of
their adherents (pp.4-5). The question of whether purely popular
sovereignty or men inspired by God determine the legitimacy and
rightfulness of functions and actions of democratic governments
constitutes the core of philosophical approach to democracy and
democratization.
Hence, the philosophical approach refers to the origin, roots
and foundation upon which institutional democracy is built. The
philosophical approach is about who defines and determines the
fundamental democratic values and their substance, and the true
meaning of the actions and functions of democratic institutions.
Therefore, the philosophical approach concerns the epistemology
or source from which, for instance, constitutions, and the principles
of equality or common good originate. According to the Muslim
philosophy of life, Allah Most High is the Ultimate Being. Allah
Most High is the originator, in Soroushs words, of guiding
democratic values and He determines the meaning and substance
of the fundamental democratic values. Unlike the West, advocates
of political Islam make a distinction between the philosophical basis
of democracy from mans reach and the realm of the Divine. When
human beings search for ways to approximate Gods beauty and
justice, then, they do not deny Gods sovereignty, they honor it.
They also honor it in the attempt to safeguard the moral values that
reflect the attributes of the divine (Abou El Fadl, 2004, p.9). In a
way, it is a negation of the humanocentric approach to knowledge
and social activity and affirmation of the Divine as the true repository
of all knowledge. It is necessary to point out that God as the ultimate
source means that He is the provider of what Abou El Fadl (2004)
terms the divine legislative will or minimal standards of moral
conduct (pp.8-9) regulating all human interactions. This divine
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legislative will is called SharÊah, as distinguished from Islamic law
or fiqh (Abu Sulayman, 1993, pp.5-15; Abou El Fadl, 2004, pp.30-
36). Shariah  is the divine ideal, standing as if suspended in
midair, unaffected and uncorrupted by lifes varies. Fiqh is the
human attempt to understand and apply that ideal. Therefore,
shariah is immutable, immaculate and flawless; fiqh is not (Abou
El Fadl, 2004, p.31).
Indeed, a point of contention between the Muslim and Western
approaches to democracy is the fact that in the latter, the popular
sovereignty originates from secularism. Democratic institutions and
principles in the West originate from a collective will and collectively
reflect the view that citizens are collectively their originator and
definer. An extreme effect of secular democracy is that it challenges
the psychological makeup of society. It shakes mans relations with
religion or his Creator. People with a religious bent of mind always
think of themselves as duty-bound to a higher source. However,
democracy and freedoms insert in people the ability to think of
themselves as possessors of the right to decide and determine without
recourse to religion and God, implicitly elevating man a God-like
character. People are transformed from duty-carriers to right-carriers,
ignoring the fact that God also has rights and He reserves the right
of approving and disapproving government policies. In utter
indifference to Gods existence or non-existence, the political
struggles and deliberations are designed to satisfy human beings
alone. Peoples satisfaction and happiness are put above that of
Gods. Fundamental questions, therefore, for proponents of
democracy in contemporary Muslim societies, irrespective of the
ideological orientations of a person, are: Does God exist? If He
exists, does He have rights? If God exists and has rights, must they
be upheld? Do governments in practice concentrate on Gods
contentment? What would governments do when Gods approval
and peoples contentment clash? Although secular thinkers may
not be oblivious to these concerns, they seldom, if ever, raise the
question of Gods rights in discussing human rights, preferring to
concentrate instead on securing peoples contentment (Soroush,
2000, p.123).
This secular philosophical tendency to politics and governance
has created ideological rifts within Muslim polities. The ideological
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divide as such has often, if not always, created uneasy and at times
violent relations between different segments of society; leading to
polarization of Muslim societies into proponents of Westernization
and those who are anti-West. The anti-West camp, loosely known
as the Islamists or advocates of political Islam,3 has become engaged
in a perennial and uncompromising debate with the secularists or
liberals. What radicalizes the relationship between the secularists
and the Islamists is the support the former receives from the
advanced liberal democratic governments. It became even more
disturbing for the Islamists when the West de-emphasized democracy
in its relations with secular authoritarian governments and turned
blind eyes on or even encouraged the military establishments in
Muslim societies to manipulate the politics in their respective
countries (Feldman, 2004, pp.60-61). The anti-West and anti-
establishment feelings within the Islamists camp often, if not always,
have turned radical due to the feeling of being denied the right to
capturing power within their own societies through the democratic
process (Hashemi, 2004, pp.49-54). Modern Turkey, Algeria and
the overthrow of the Hamas government in the occupied Palestinian
territories in 2007 are some examples illustrating the philosophical
dimension of the tensions within the Muslim societies and the
predicament of democracy and democratization of Muslim societies
(p.59).
 ×arakat al-MuqÉwamah al-IslÉmiyyah  (Hamas), the Palestinian
Islamic Resistance Movement, founded in 1987 (Tamim, 2007,
pp.10-34; Hroub, 2000, pp.36-41, 292-312), adopted the
institutional approach to democracy as its strategy for capturing
power. It participated in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections
and won 76 of the 132 seats of Palestinian Parliament. However,
Hamass philosophy, as stated in its 1988 Charter, is to create an
Islamic state in the territories it calls Palestine, and suggests that all
democratic values such as justice and human rights should reflect
features of the Muslim philosophy of life. Hamass 36 articles of the
Charter provide details about its founding beliefs regarding the
primacy of Islam in all aspects of life. The Charters advocacy of an
Islamic state originates from the fundamental sources of the Muslim
philosophy of life: the QurÉn and Prophet Muhammads traditions.
The Charter states that the movement aims to make Allah Most High
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rule over every inch of Palestine, for under the banner of Islam
adherents of all religions can coexist. Hamas holds that a Western
dominated free-market capitalist economy is against the teachings
of Islam. Despite being committed to the institutional approach to
democracy, Hamass philosophy as such clashed with that of Fatah,
allegedly a secular centre-left nationalist Palestinian Resistance
Movement (Hroub, 2000, p.28; Abu-Amr, 1994, p.28). The conflict
between Hamas and Fatah is both ideological and political. They
disagree on issues that relate to the nature of the polity and the strategy
of liberating Palestine from the occupation of Israelis. Though Hroub
(2000) argues that the disagreement between Hamas and Fatah is
more about the strategy of liberating Palestine (pp.87-143), there is
sufficient literature to suggest an ideological dimension to the
tensions between Hamas, Fatah and the West (Abu-Amr, 1994, pp.23-
52). In June 2007, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, the
leader of Fatah, under pressure from Western powers, ousted
Hamass elected Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyya, bringing out into
the open the existence of tensions between the advocates of an
Islamic and a secular Palestinian state. The willingness of the Western
advanced democratic states such as the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan and Australia
to sacrifice democracy and unequivocal support of Fatah while
considering Hamas a terrorist organization, despite Hamass
democratic credentials, has radicalized the existing tense relations
between Hamas and Fatah.
Similarly, Algerias National Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
adopted the institutional approach to democracy and
democratization. However, the annulment and cancellation of the
1991 elections for the National Assembly by Algerias secular military
junta, despite the rejection of violence of all kinds by FIS leaders,
and its declared or expressed commitment to a Western-style
multiparty democracy, free market economy, competition and a
strong private sector, was a deliberate decision against the stated
goal of the FIS to establish an Islamic state ruled by  Islamic law and
the introduction of an Islamic banking and financial system. Anwar
N. Haddam, the president of the FIS Parliamentary Delegation
Abroad, expressed the desire of of the FIS for progress along Western
models when he argued that the West progressed because it had the
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courage to defeat tyranny and observe human rights including rights
to franchise, and that the FIS was willing to follow suit (Pipes  &
Clawson, 1996). The establishment worried about Islamists
becoming a formidable force in Algerian politics and believed that
the FIS would change the Constitution and democratically impose
an Islamic state. Obviously, the relations between the establishment
and the Islamists radicalized when the latter was denied the right to
come to power through elections. Academics argue that while Algeria
missed the chance of becoming a genuine democratic state, the West,
by turning a blind eye on the events taking shape in Algeria, is
equally responsible for the tragedy that democracy and the Algerians
experienced in the 1990s.
The Democratic Republic of Turkey, despite the allegedly
incumbent Islamist party being committed to the institutional
approach to democracy and democratization, is yet another instance
of the secular tendency to democratization, creating uneasy relations
between Islamists and the secularists. Constitutionally and practically
a secular state by and large (Cinar, 2005), Turkey is founded on the
principle of laicism (state control of religion), in which no party can
claim that it represents a form of religious belief. The parties accused
of religious orientation banned by the Constitutional Court for
Islamist activities and attempts to redefine the secular nature of the
republic include: the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver
Cumhuriyet Firkasi, banned in 1925), the Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi, banned in 1998) and the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, banned
in 2001). Turkeys ruling Justice and Development Party or Adalet
ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), despite portraying itself as a moderate,
conservative, pro-Western party advocating a free-market economy,
has often been accused of harbouring a hidden Islamist agenda.
Academics and critics argue that the main factor behind the growth
of AKP in Turkish politics is its Islamist agenda, even though its
leader, the incumbent Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has
argued that the AKP is not a political party with a religious axis. The
changes the AKP has introduced have been interpreted as being
non-secular or rooted in Islam. Abdullah Gül, AKPs nominee for
the president of the republic, is the first president of Turkey whose
wife wears a ÍijÉb (headscarf). In 2008, the Turkish Parliament
rejected his nomination for president on the grounds of his Islamist
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credentials, forcing the AKP to seek a new mandate from the people.
Erdogan has spoken out in favour of the Islamization of Turkish
society. In 1999, Merve Kavakç1, a newly-elected Virtue Party
woman parliamentarian was not allowed to take oath in the National
Assembly due to wearing a headscarf, as women wearing
headscarves constitutionally cannot work in the public sector
(Demirel, 2008, pp.163-182; Human Rights Watch Country Report,
2007).
In 2005, the AKP banned the sale of alcoholic beverages in a
section of Ankara. Strict licensing requirements were put into place.
The AKP has also been accused of appointing anti-secular individuals
in key government offices and giving out government contracts to
individuals with a reputation for being Islamist. An Islamist watershed
occurred when Turkeys AKP-dominated parliament, on February
9, 2008, promulgated a constitutional amendment that lifted the ban
on headscarves in universities, suggesting the influence of the
Muslim philosophy of life on Turkish politics and society. However,
in June 2008, Turkeys Constitutional Court reversed the proposed
lifting of this ban on the grounds of it being against the secular
character of the Turkish Constitution. The Court also ruled that its
decision cannot be appealed. After the partys attempt to lift the
headscarf ban, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of
Appeals, Abdurrahman Yalçinkaya, backed by Turkeys powerful
military establishment, on March 14, 2008, formally asked the
Constitutional Court to ban the party. Though the Court did not ban
the party, it considered its actions as anti-secular, cutting its funding
from the Central Bank into half as a penalty, signalling the existence
of authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies to maintain secularism in
Turkey. Serdar Demirel (2008) argues that the White Turks or the
deep state (i.e., the republican elite, the bureaucracy and the
military), perceived as the centre in Turkey, controls public life. They
are the minority. With the democratization of Turkish society, the
power will shift away to the mostly religiously inclined Black Turks
or the periphery. According to Demirel (2008), the AKP represents
this conservative periphery in Turkish politics (pp.172-173).
The above examples and numerous other cases such as the
Muslim Brotherhood Movement of Egypt and the Islamic parties in
Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Indonesia and Afghanistan
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suggest that the advocates of political Islam in these Muslim societies
have adopted the values and procedures of institutional democracy.
They have decided to come to power through peaceful and
constitutional mechanisms such as elections and participation in the
political processes of their respective societies. Islamists have
founded political parties, participate in welfare projects and services
often provided by civic institutions and have expressed commitment
to values of justice, freedoms, accountability, rule of law and so
forth. Yet, they have faced an uphill battle in their own societies.
The secularists and the military establishments within Muslim
societies and the advanced Western polities have often individually
and sometimes collectively resisted the Islamists rise to power and
control of the government. The institutions and agencies that might
link the state and the Islamists were undermined, obliterated and
abolished. In the shadow of authoritarian rule, the Islamic actors
were either muted or left only with the option of insurgency in order
to make themselves heard by unresponsive rulers (Turam, 2007,
p.155).
Engagement: The way out
The above discussion suggests that the institutional and philosophical
approaches to democracy and democratization are inseparable. It
also suggests that the seculars and the West have a genuine fear of
the Islamists agenda, that is, adhering to the fundamental principles
of the philosophical approach to democracy in administration of
life and society. The secularists fear that the Islamists will use the
teachings of Islam found in the QurÉn and traditions of Prophet
Muhammad instead of popular sovereignty as benchmarks for the
interpretation of fundamental democratic values such as justice and
accountability. The secular origin of Western democracy polarizes
Muslim societies into supporters of secularism and political Islam,
leading to radicalization of the latter when denied democratic space.
This raises a genuine concern regarding compatibility of the Muslim
philosophy of life and Western democratic experience rooted in
secularism (Esposito & Voll, 1996, pp.3-32). It appears that
democratization of Muslim societies in the image of Western liberal
democracy is difficult.
Yet, the supporters of political Islam, while opposing the secular
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basis of Western democracy, hold to its institutional basis, which
can moderate the destabilizing impact of democracy on Muslim
societies. It can also provide room for dialogue between Islam and
the West. A peaceful coexistence between Islamists and seculars, on
the one hand, and Muslim societies and the West, on the other, is
possible if the relations among them focus on issues that are human
properties irrespective of religion, ethnicity or language such as
justice, tolerance, human rights, equality, constitutionalism and the
like. Focus on common denominators and human values can prevent
misuse and abuse of religion to justify regime survival, authoritarian
or otherwise. No one, neither Islamist nor secular, would be able to
use the QurÉn, the gospel or the bible to legitimize a malignant
hold on power.
Berna Turam (2007), reflecting on Turkish experience, suggests
that the Islamists, secularists and the West need to work hard to
create (1) a strong civil society that can balance state oppression
and (2) the various societal actors that can coexists without feeling
of being threatened or obliterated by the other (pp.7-11). According
to Turam, the demise of confrontation and emergence of cooperation
between Islam and [a] secular state in Turkish context (p.8) came
about when the fear of secularists being threatened by an Islamically-
oriented ruling AKP disappeared through the AKPs commitment to
fundamental democratic values. The decline of authoritarianism has
the potential for the demise or decline of confrontation and the
emergence of cooperation between the state and societal forces.
Ahmet Davutoglu (1994) rightfully argues that the dialogue
between Islam and the West can be more meaningful if the West
perceives Islam as an alternative Weltanschauung (worldview) to
the Western philosophico-political tradition, rather than from the
perspective of the ideological intransigence of Islam vis-a-vis the
Western world today (p.2). Therefore, the effective basis for
dialogue between Islam and the West can exist when the West accepts
Islam as its equal and debate over democracy and democratization
between the West, secularists and Islamists takes place within this
frame of mind. Davutoglus argument suggests that for consolidation
of democracy in the Muslim world, the West should persuade the
secularists and the supporters of political Islam to engage in a debate
over how the fundamental human values can best be protected and
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how the religion of Islam can best help Muslims to protect and
promote human rights and human values. This approach will defeat
extremism and fundamentalism in the Muslim world.
Conclusion
This study focuses on the challenge democracy and democratization
pose to contemporary Muslim societies. It discusses the meaning
and approaches to democracy and the relationship between
democracy, Islam and secularism. The study concludes that the
factors of instability within Muslim societies also include the
philosophical differences between the Muslim and Western
approaches to democracy and democratization. It also suggests that
the ideological divide is more serious and destabilizing as it creates
an uncompromising perennial debate between the Islamists and
secularists within Muslim societies, with the possibility of becoming
radicalized. The relation between the Islamists and secularists
becomes even more radicalized when advanced Western democratic
states cooperate with the secular intelligentsia or elites of Muslim
societies against the rise and participation of the Islamists in the
political process of their respective countries. The institutional
approach, however, has a moderating role, if the Islamists, the
secularists and the West perceive Islam and secularism as an
alternative weltanschauung with their own axiological, ontological
and epistemological presuppositions and focus on issues that are
human properties, irrespective of religion, ethnicity or language such
as religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence, limitation of power,
justice, and human rights.
Endnotes
1. For details of the origin and nature of secularism and its impact on life and
society in the Muslim World, see Esposito, J. & Tamimi, A. (Eds). (2000).  Islam
and secularism in the Middle East. UK: C. Hurst & Co.
2. Most modern Muslim such as Abu Sulayman (1993, pp.5-15) and Khaled
Abou El Fadl (2004, p.31) and Western thinkers like John L. Esposito (2004)
argue that SharÊah has been incorrectly translated as Islamic law by Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. According to Esposito (2004), Islamic law means the
body of law developed by Muslim Jurists in the past (pp.97-98).
3. Islamists or advocates of political Islam are not a uniform or a united
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movement. They differ in their interpretations of fundamental sources of Islam,
understanding of the relationship between Islam and modernity and goals,
approaches, policies and strategies to capturing power. They can be categorized
into radicals/fundamentalists, traditionalists (conservative) and moderates.
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